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NOTE
Indians: Modem Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian
Parties: The Supreme Court Takes Another Bite Out of
Tribal Sovereignty in Strate v. A-1 Contractors
L Introduction
Indian tribes occupy a unique status in American law. Before European
immigration to America, Indian tribes were self-governing sovereign political
communities. They exercised unlimited power over all people within their
communities.' Indian tribes, however, no longer possess "the full attributes of
sovereignty."3 Recent court decisions often describe Indian tribes as "quasi-
sovereigns."' By incorporating within the United States' territory and accepting its
1. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). However, during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court seemed to have differing opinions on
the extent Indian nations are independent sovereigns. The Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832) stated:
From the commencement of our government, Congress has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these
acts. . . manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right
to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed
[sic] by the United States.
Id. at 556. Still other cases held that tribal sovereignty was inferior to the sovereignty of both the federal
and state governments. For example, the Court in Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901), stated
that:
North American Indians do not and never have constituted 'nations'.... The word 'nation'
as ordinarily used presupposes or implies ... sovereign power more or less absolute, an
organized government, recognized officials, a system of laws, definite boundaries and the
power to enter into negotiations with other nations. These characteristics the Indians have
possessed only in a limited degree. ... Owing to the natural infirmities of the Indian
character, their fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, their mutual jealousies and
animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental training, they have as a rule shown
a total want of that cohesive force necessary to the making up of a nation in the ordinary
sense of the word. As they had no established laws, no recognized method of choosing
their sovereigns by inheritance or election, no officers with defined powers, their
governments in their original state were nothing more than a temporary submission to an
intellectual or physical superior, who in some cases ruled with absolute authority, and in
others, was recognized only so long as he was able to dominate the tribe by the qualities
which originally enabled him to secure their leadership.
id. at 265.
2. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985).
3. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
4. See BLACK's LAW DICnONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term "quasi" as "[a]s if; almost
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protection,' Indian tribes have been divested of some aspects of sovereignty that
they previously enjoyed. Treaties and statutes, which fall under the exercise of
Congress' plenary control,6 have divested Indian tribes of other aspects of
sovereignty.7
One of the first United States Supreme Court holdings limiting Indian sovereignty
was based on the Discovery Doctrine This Doctrine stated that any European
nation discovering lands, unclaimed by another European nation, possessed the "sole
right of acquiring the soil from the natives."9 In other words, the Doctrine gave the
government making "discovery" full rights of title over the lands against all other
European governments. Indian tribes were allowed to retain possession and use
of the land. However, "their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.""
A stream of Supreme Court decisions involving jurisdictional disputes between
an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe represents one of the largest limitations
placed on modern tribal sovereignty. 2 Tribal sovereignty no longer stretches
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control tribes' inter-
as it were; analogous to. This term is used in legal phraseology to indicate that one subject resembles
another, with which it is compared, in certain characteristics, but that there are intrinsic and material
differences between thcm").
5. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568-69, 574 (1823) (describing some of the
inherent limitations on tribal powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States).
6. See United Stxtes v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1154 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "plenary" as "[flull, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified").
7. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that Indian "tribes'
retained powers are not such that they are limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional
enactments.... Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that
are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status"' (quoting Oliphant
v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976))).
8. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 (holding that an Indian tribe could not pass legal title in land it held
by a federal grant to a non-Indian); see also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90
(1955). The Court stated in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians that
[elvery American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived
of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres
by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale by the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land.
Id.
9. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 574.
12. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53 (1985)
(holding that the issue of whether a tribal court has civil jurisdiction over non-members is a "federal
question" and falls under the jurisdiction of federal courts); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191,211-12 (1978) (holding Indian tribes cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts); Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-668 (1974); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832) (holding Indian tribes cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign
nations); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (holding that Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate the land they
occupy to non-Indians).
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nal relations. 3 The inherent powers tribes still possess include: (1) the power to
decide their form of government; (2) the power to set the conditions for membership
in the tribe; (3) the power to lay and collect taxes; (4) the power to regulate
domestic relations among their members; (5) the power to regulate property use
within their borders; and (6) the power to prescribe laws for their members and to
punish infractions of those laws.'
This note will first discuss civil jurisdiction in tribal courts. Because a discussion
of criminal jurisdiction in tribal courts is also necessary to understand fully the
reasoning behind recent decisions regarding civil jurisdiction, Part II of this note
discusses cases involving criminal jurisdiction in tribal courts. Part II is divided into
subparts discussing the law as it exists when the criminal defendant is: (1) an Indian
who is a member of the prosecuting tribe; (2) an Indian who is a member of a
different tribe than the prosecutor; and (3) a non-Indian. Part I examines the cases
regarding civil jurisdiction in tribal courts. Part III is also divided into subparts
discussing tribal adjudicatory and regulatory authority. The distinction between
these two facets of tribal authority is important in understanding tribal civil
jurisdiction. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding
tribal civil jurisdiction, Strate v. A-1 Contractors. Part V deals with the problems
associated with this decision and argues that the Supreme Court committed a grave
error.
IL Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
A. Criminal Jurisdiction over Tribal Members
In United States v. Wheeler,6 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
a tribal court has criminal jurisdiction over members of its own tribe. The Court
held that "the sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses
clearly does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost
by virtue of their dependent status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between
an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."'
7
The respondent in Wheeler was a member of the Navajo Tribe. He pled guilty
in the tribal court to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A federal grand
jury indicted him for statutory rape arising out of the same incident. The respondent
moved to dismiss the federal indictment because the tribal offense of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor was a lesser included offense of statutory rape.
Therefore, he claimed that the tribal court proceeding barred subsequent federal
prosecution. The district court granted the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
13. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1415 (1997) (citing Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
14. See id. at 1416 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
15. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
16. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
17. d. at 326.
1998]
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holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred respon-
dent's federal trial."
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court held
that tribes act as independent sovereigns, and not as arms of the government, in
criminally punishin.g a tribal member. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar a subsequent federal indictment arising out of the same crime. The Court
reasoned:
[T]he dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction
is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine
their external relations. But, the powers of self-government, including
the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a
different type. They involve only the relations among members of a
tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by
virtue of a tribe's dependent status. "[Tihe settled doctrine of the law of
nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence -
its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking
its protection."''
In other words, the power to punish tribal members for the violation of tribal
crimes is a part of tribal sovereignty that has never been taken away. It is in no
way attributable to a delegation of federal authority. Therefore, when tribes exercise
criminal jurisdiction over tribal offenders, they do so "as part of [their] retained
sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government."'"
However, the Court noticed that this notion of dual sovereignty could frustrate
the federal interest in prosecuting major crimes. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) provides that
tribal courts cannot impose criminal punishment greater than six months imprison-
ment or a $500 fine.' Therefore, "when both a federal prosecution for a major
crime and a tribal prosecution for a lesser included offense are possible, the
defendant will often face the potential of a mild tribal punishment and a federal
punishment of substantial severity."' The differences in potential punishment
would surely persuade the tribal members to seek prosecution in tribal courts to
avoid the more severe federal punishment'u Therefore, the court held that federal
courts retain jurisdiction over most major crimes committed by Indians.' "Since
tribal and federal prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns, they are not 'for
the same offence,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one when the
other has occurred."'
18. See United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-29.
20. Id. (citing Worm.ster v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
21. Id. at 328.
22. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994).
23. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330.
24. See id. at 330-31.
25. See id at 329-30.
26. Id.
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B. Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians
In Duro v. Reina,27 the Court addressed the issue of whether one tribe's court has
criminal jurisdiction over an Indian of a different tribe. In Duro, the petitioner
allegedly shot and killed an Indian youth within a reservation. Although the
petitioner lived on the reservation, he was a member of another tribe. The tribal
court charged him with the illegal firing of a weapon on the reservation, a
misdemeanor under the tribal criminal code.u
The petitioner filed in the tribal court a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
After the tribal court denied the motion, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the
federal district court. The court granted the writ, holding that allowing the tribe to
assert jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian is racial discrimination in violation of
the equal protection guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.2 The
district court reasoned that subjecting a nonmember Indian to tribal jurisdiction is
discrimination based on race when a non-Indian, under the same circumstances,
would not be subject to tribal jurisdiction,"
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed." Relying on Wheeler,32 the court
held that tribal courts retain jurisdiction over minor crimes committed by Indians
against Indians, regardless of tribal membership 3 In reaching its decision, the
court examined federal criminal statutes that were applicable to Indian country.'
The court reasoned that references to "Indians" in those statutes and the cases
construing them applied to all Indians. The court stated that "if Congress had
intended to divest tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians they
would have done so."3 The court also rejected the petitioner's equal protection
claim. It reasoned that because the petitioner resided with a tribal member on the
reservation, he had significant contacts with the prosecuting tribe. These contacts
justified tribal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that Indian tribes may not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian?7
The court noted that a basic attribute of territorial sovereignty is the sovereign's
power to enforce its laws against its own citizens or aliens.' The court recognized
that Indian tribes no longer possess the full attributes of a full territorial sovereign.
Tribes only retain the sovereignty needed to "control their own internal relations,
27. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
28. See id. at 681.
29. See id. at 682.
30. See id.
31. See Duro v. Reina, 821 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1987). Both the panel opinion and the dissent were
later revised in Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. See United Sates v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1977).
33. See Duro, 851 F.2d, at 1143.
34. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1994).
35. Duro, 851 F.2d, at 1143.
36. See id. at 1143-44.
37. See Duo v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1989).
38. See id. at 685.
1998]
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and to preserve their own unique customs and social order."39 Limited sovereignty
includes the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, when the laws
involve the relations among members of a tribe.'
However, the Court noted that if the jurisdictional scheme laid out in its decision
"proves insufficient to meet the practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then
the proper body to address the problem is Congress, which has the ultimate
authority over Indian affairs."'" Shortly after the Duro decision, Congress gave
tribal courts the power "to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."
42
C. Criminal Jurisd;ction over Non-Indians
In Oliphant v. SL;quamish Indian Tribe,43 the Supreme Court dealt with the issue
of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The two petitioners in Oliphant
were non-Indian residents of the Port Madison Reservation. The tribal police
arrested and charged Petitioner Oliphant with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
arrest. After arraignment before the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his own
recognizance. Petitioner Belgarde was arrested by the tribal police after an alleged
high-speed chase through reservation highways. Tribal police apprehended Belgarde
when his car collided with a tribal police vehicle. Belgarde was charged under the
Tribal Code with injuring tribal property and "recklessly endangering another
person."'
Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States district
court, arguing that the tribal court did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. In separate proceedings, the district court denied both petitions. The
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that tribal courts do not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, unless specifically authorized by
Congress.45 The Court noted Justice Johnson's concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck,'
the first Indian case to reach the Supreme Court, which stated that the Indian tribes
have lost any "right of governing every person within their limits except themsel-
ves."
47
Together, Oliplu t, Wheeler, and Duro define tribal criminal jurisdiction as
extending only over Indians. However, these cases also carry a "parallel analysis
and statement of reasons applicable to jurisdiction or power by the Indians over all
39. id. at 685-86.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 698.
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994). See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994) (defining an "Indian" as "any
person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under section 1153 of
Title 18 if that person wiere to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country to which that
section applies").
43. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). But see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316 (1977) (limiting the
tribe's powers to set the final punishment for non-Indian criminals); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
617 F.2d 537, 550 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concurring), affd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (en bane).
44. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
45. See id. at 194-S6.
46. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
47. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147).
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matters relating to nonmembers."" This case law establishes that unless there is
express congressional authorization, "tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of
nonmembers exists in only limited circumstances."'49 The Supreme Court has used
these decisions as a basis for a line of cases denying tribal civil regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
III. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
A. Tribal Regulatory Authority / "The Montana Rule"
Relying on Oliphant's general proposition that tribal sovereignty does not extend
to the activities of nonmembers,' the United States Supreme Court in Montana v.
United States took a huge bite out of tribal sovereignty."' The Montana Court held
that the Crow Tribe did not have the authority to regulate hunting and fishing
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands, when the land is owned in fee simple
by a nonmember of the tribe.'
The Court established the "Montana Rule,"53 which states that unless Congress
gives express authorization, Indian tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over a
nonmember for disputes arising on land within the reservation that is non-Indian-
owned.' However, two exceptions exist. First, the tribes retain civil jurisdiction
over a nonmember who enters a consensual relationship with the tribe or its
members. Second, the tribes retain civil jurisdiction over a nonmember for activity
that affects the tribes' political integrity, economic security, health or welfare.5
48. Merrion, 617 F.2d at 555.
49. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409.
50. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). However, the Court in Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959), held that tribal courts have exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction over claims
that arise on tribal lands, even if one of the parties is not an Indian. The Williams Court dealt with a civil
dispute between an Indian and a non-Indian, arising from a transaction that took place in Indian country.
The Court held the tribal court retains jurisdiction, unless: (1) there is clear congressional authorization
for the state to exercise jurisdiction; or (2) there is no significant Indian interest in maintaining
jurisdiction. The Court stated that giving jurisdiction to the state
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian
took place there. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for
Congress to do it.
Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
51. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
52. See id at 566.
53. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409-10.
54. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-67.
55. See id. at 564-66. The Court stated that
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
1998]
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In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,' the
Court took yet another bite out of tribal sovereignty. In determining whether a tribe
had the authority to issue zoning ordinances on fee lands within the reservation, the
Court drastically limited a tribe's ability to rely on the second exception to the
Montana Rule. The Court held that it is not enough that the non-Indian's activity
merely affects the tribe. The Court stated that "the impact [on the tribe] must be
demonstrably serious and must imperil the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health and welfare of the tribe."'
The decisions in Montana and Brendale established a presumption that absent
congressional authority, jurisdiction over non-Indians does not lie in tribal courts.
This presumption can be rebutted if the party claiming tribal jurisdiction satisfies
one of the two Montana exceptions. These exceptions are satisfied when the non-
Indian enters a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, or when the
non-Indian's activity affects the tribes' political integrity, economic security, health
or welfare. In other words, a tribe may only exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian
if his conduct is directly related to the internal affairs of the tribe. However,
Montana and Oliphant do not govern cases involving conduct by tribal members for
conduct occurring on tribal lands. In these cases, there still exists a presumption in
favor of tribal authority."
B. Tribal Adjudicatory Authority / "The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine"
Three years after Montana drastically limited tribal regulatory authority, the
Supreme Court decided National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians." The plaintiff in National Farmers was the guardian of a Crow Indian
minor. The minor was injured when a motorcycle struck him in a school parking
lot, which was within the Crow Indian Reservation. However, the land on which
the school was built belonged to the State of Montana.
On behalf of the. minor, the plaintiff filed an action in the Crow Tribal Court
seeking damages against the school district. After the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment, the schcol district filed an action in the United States district court for
an injunction invalidating the default judgment. The school district claimed that 28
U.S.C. § 1331 gave the district court "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."' The district court
held that tribal courts do not have civil jurisdiction over an action against a non-
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct thriatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or. welfare of the tribe.
Id.
56. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
57. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
58. See Nell Jessup Newton, In the U.S. Supreme Court: Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Personal
Injury Actions Between Non-Indians, WEs's LEGAL NEws, Dec. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL
738536, at 5.0.
59. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1,31 (1994).
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Indian and granted the district's motion for an injunction prohibiting execution of
the tribal court's judgment.6' The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court did not have jurisdiction.'
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held
that the district court has the authority to determine whether a tribal court has
exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.' However, the district court must
wait until the party challenging tribal jurisdiction has exhausted all available
remedies in the tribal court.' The Court also held that the district court should
decide whether it should dismiss or suspend the federal action, pending tribal court
proceedings." In reaching this decision, the Court introduced the "Tribal Exhaus-
tion Doctrine." However, the Court did not address the issue of tribal civil
adjudicatory authority over non-Indians and remanded the case to the' tribal
courts.'
In National Farmers, the Supreme Court distinguished its holding in Oliphant,
which involved criminal jurisdiction, from cases involving disputes of civil
jurisdiction. The Court stated that:
[T]he existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a
detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied
in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions. 7
The Court, recognizing Congress' commitment "to a policy of supporting tribal self-
government and self-determination," held that this examination should first be made
by a tribal court.' This decision encourages the tribal courts to provide a full
record of the case's development in the tribal court, explaining the court's precise
basis for accepting or denying jurisdiction. Therefore, the tribal court would give
the district court the benefit of the tribe's expertise in making this determination of
tribal sovereignty."
More than thirty years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,° the
Supreme Court had another chance to address the issue of adjudicatory authority
over non-Indians. However, as in National Farmers, the Court evaded the issue.
The plaintiff in Iowa Mutual was a Blackfeet Indian. He filed a civil action against
61. See National Farmers, 560 F. Supp. 213, 218 (D. Mont. 1983).
62. See National Farmers, 736 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
64. See id. at 857.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id at 855-56.
68. Id. at 856.
69. See id.
70. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
1998]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
a non-Indian company in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, alleging injuries sustained on
the Indian lands."
Using the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, the Court held that federal courts cannot
exercise diversity jurisdiction until the party challenging tribal jurisdiction has
exhausted-all of his remedies within the tribal courts. The Court reasoned that tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians for activities occurring on reservation lands is an
important part of tribal sovereignty. Therefore, civil jurisdiction over such activities
presumptively lies in the tribal courts, unless Congress has expressly limited it.7"
Both National Farmers and Iowa Mutual involved defendants who tried to
circumvent the tribal courts and to proceed directly to the district court. These cases
declined to extend Oliphant to civil cases arising on reservations and involving non-
Indian defendants. They held that civil jurisdiction over such activities
presumptively lies in the tribal courts. Unless a specific treaty provision or federal
statute affirmativ'ely limits jurisdiction, the district courts put litigation on hold until
the tribal court has decided its own jurisdiction.7'
IV. Strate v. A-1 Contractors
A. Facts
In Strate v. A-i Contractors," the Supreme Court was faced with its first case
after the tribal court remedies had been exhausted. Strate directly addresses the
issue of whether tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over a dispute among non-
Indians. The case stemmed from personal injuries sustained by Gisela Fredericks
when her vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Lyle Stokert, A-1 Contractors'
employee. A-1 C,ntractors also owned the vehicle Stokert was driving. The
accident occurred on a North Dakota state highway which runs through the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation, home to the Three Affiliated Tribes. This stretch of
highway is open to the public and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally
granted right-of-way. The United States holds the land underlying the highway in
trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and its members."
Neither party was a tribal member. Fredericks was the widow of a deceased tribal
member. She had five adult children' who were members of one of the Three
Affiliated Tribes, and she owned property on the reservation. A-1 Contractors was
a non-Indian-owned business, which principally operated outside the reservation.
However, at the time of the accident, it was under a subcontract with a tribal owned
corporation to perform landscaping within the reservation.78 The issue facing the
71. See i& at 11.
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
73. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
74. See Newton, snpra note 58, at 4.0.
75. 117 S. Ct. 140 (1997).
76. See id. at 1408.
77. Lyndon Benedict Fredericks, Kenneth Lee Fredericks, Paul Jonas Fredericks, Hans Christian
Fredericks, and Jeb Piu; Fredericks.
78. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1408. It is important to note that the record did not reveal whether or
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Supreme Court in Strate was whether, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the
Tribes to govern the conduct of non-Indians on the highway in question, the tribal
court had civil jurisdiction over this dispute.
B. Procedural History
Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three
Affiliated Tribes against A-1 Contractors and Stockert (respondents). Fredericks'
five adult children joined as plaintiffs and filed an action for loss of consortium.
Fredericks and her children (petitioners) claimed damages in excess of $13
million. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss in the tribal court for lack of
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The tribal court denied the motion, stating
that: (1) the petitioners were residents of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation and
had the right to seek relief in the tribal courts; (2) the respondents entered a
consensual business relationship with the Tribe; and (3) the court's exercise of
jurisdiction was not barred by treaty, federal law, or constitutional provision. The
respondents then appealed, and the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals
affirmed.'
The respondents then filed an action in the federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction
against further proceedings in the tribal court. The district court dismissed the
action by granting petitioners' motion for summary judgment. The district court
decided that the tribal court had both personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction. The court distinguished Oliphant, noting that the principles governing
civil jurisdiction are different from those governing criminal jurisdiction." The
court held that Indian tribes have retained the inherent sovereignty to exercise
jurisdiction over civil cases involving non-Indians, unless treaties or federal statutes
have specifically limited jurisdiction. The court concluded that no treaty or statute
limiting jurisdiction existed.'
C. Decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the respondents only addressed the issue of
whether the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.'3 A three-
judge panel affirmed the district court's ruling.'M However, the court agreed to
rehear the decision en banc. It then reversed the district court in an 8-4 decision."
The court relied on Montana as the controlling precedent, holding that the conduct
giving rise to this dispute did not satisfy the two exceptions stated in the Montana
not Stockert was actually doing work for the tribal contract at the time of the accident.
79. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, No. A1-92-94, 1992 WL 696330, at *1 (D.N.D Sept. 16, 1992).
80. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1408.
81. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855.
82. See Strate, 1992 WL 696330, at *9-10.
83. See Strate, 1994 WL 666051, at *2.
84. See id. at *1-2.
85. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 941 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Rule. Therefore, the court concluded that the tribal court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute.
The petitioners contended that they satisfied the first Montana exception because
the respondents entered a "consensual relationship" with the Tribe and because
Stockert was on the reservation pursuant to this relationship when the accident
occurred. However, the Eighth Circuit held that there was no consensual relation-
ship between the respondents and the Tribe. The court reasoned that the dispute
arose out of a "simple personal injury tort claim . .. from an automobile ac-
cident."' It did not arise under the terms of the respondents' subcontract with the
Tribe.
The petitioners also contended that they satisfied the second exception. They
claimed that the respondents' conduct affected the Tribe's political integrity because
it occurred on tht, reservation.' However, the court decided that this "case has
nothing to do witi the Indian tribe's ability to govern its own affairs."' It merely
involves the conduct of a non-Indian and the Tribe's power to exercise judicial
authority over him.9" Therefore, the court determined that the Tribe's interest in
asserting civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian in a tort claim does not satisfy the
second Montana exception.'
D. The Supreme Court's Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed 3 In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court held that unless there is express congressional authorization, a tribal court's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its regulatory jurisdiction over non-
Indians.' Therefore, "[s]ubject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and
the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and
their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally 'does not extend to the
nonmembers of the tribe."'95
E. Decision
The petitioners' first contention was that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual
establish a presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction, even if the case involves non-
Indians. However, the Court held that Montana was the controlling precedent.'
The Court reasoned that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual merely describe the
86. See id. at 940-41.
87. Id. at 940.
88. See id. at 94[.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 940.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
94. See id. at 1413.
95. Id.
96. See id at 1410.
97. See id.
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exhaustion rule that allows tribal courts to decide the extent of their own jurisdic-
tion. The exhaustion rule does not establish tribal adjudicatory authority over non-
Indians. 8 The Court stated that these decisions "enunciate only an exhaustion
requirement, a 'prudential rule,' based on comity.... [and] do not expand or stand
apart from Montana's instruction.""
Therefore, the Court adopted Montana's general rule that absent express
authorization, Indian tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, unless:
(1) the tribes retain civil jurisdiction over a nonmember who enters a consensual
relationship with the tribe or its members; or (2) the tribes retain civil jurisdiction
over a nonmember for activity that affects the tribes' political integrity, economic
security, health or welfare."
However, the Montana Rule requires "a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as
well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied
in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions..... Only after
the Montana Court examined the treaties and legislation relied on by the Tribe, did
the Court establish the Montana Rule and its exceptions. The Montana Court clearly
stated that its exceptions only apply when there is not a specific treaty or federal
statute directing otherwise."
The petitioners' second contention was that Montana did not govern because the
Tribe held the land underlying the scene of the accident in trust for the Tribe.
However, the Court decided that Montana applied to this issue because the accident
"related to nonmember activity on alienated, non-Indian reservation land."' 3 The
accident occurred on a right-of-way which was granted from the United States to
the state of North Dakota.1a4.
Therefore, the Court required the petitioners to show that this case fell under one
of Montana's two exceptions. The first exception covers "'activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.""'  The Court held
that the respondent was engaged in subcontract work with the Tribe, not with the
petitioners. "Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the tribes
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1413; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1980).
100. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997); Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
101. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1411 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56).
102. See id
103. Id. at 1413.
104. See id; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (1994) (governing federal grants of right-of-way over
Indian lands).
105. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
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were strangers to the accident."'" Therefore, no "consensual relationship" existed
between the petitioners and respondents.
Montana's second exception concerns conduct that "'threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.""'  The Court noted that this exception can easily be misunderstood.
Although Indian tribes retain considerable inherent control over non-Indian conduct
on tribal land, a tribe's inherent power does not extend beyond "what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.""' The Court held
that the tribe does not need to retain regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over
accidents occurring on state highways to preserve its rights to make and enforce its
own laws.
Upon reaching the decision that neither of the Montana Rule's two exceptions
applies,"° the Court held that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over a civil
tort claim against a non-Indian. Therefore, the Court stated that petitioners could
pursue their case against A-1 Contractors and Stockert in state court."0
V. Analysis
Strate is a prime example of a hard case making bad law. Arguably, the Montana
Rule is not relevant to the issue of tribal adjudicatory authority over civil lawsuits.
The Supreme Court simply failed to recognize the differences between civil
adjudicatory authority and regulatory or legislative authority. Civil adjudicatory
authority is the power of a tribal court to "hear the type of case that is then before
it."' However, regulatory or legislative authority is the power to apply tribal laws
to conduct occurring on tribal lands."'
In those cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to uphold the assertion
of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court has found congressional
divestment of tribal sovereignty through the alienation of Indian land to non-
Indians."' The decisions in Montana and Brendale involved express congressional
divestment of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on non-
Indian land. The Montana Court distinguished the issue of the Tribe's authority over
106. Id. at 1415 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (declaring tribal jurisdiction
exclusive over lawsuit wrising out of on-reservation sales transaction between nonmember plaintiff and
member defendants); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on
nonmember-owned livestock within boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947,
950 (8th Cir. 1905) (upholding tribe's permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting business
within tribe's borders; court characterized as "inherent" the tribe's "authoity... to prescribe the terms
upon which noncitizens may transact business within its borders"). Measured against these cases, the
Fredericks-Stockert highway accident presents no "consensual relationship" of the qualifying kind.
107. Strate, 117 S Ct. at 1415 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
108. See id. at 1416; Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
109. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1416.
110. See id (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 854 (6th ed. 1990)
112. See Newton, vupra note 58, at 4.0.
113. See Montana 450 U.S. at 561 (stating that "treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must
be read in light of the tubsequent alienation of those lands" by Congress).
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the activities of non-Indians on Indian land from the issue of tribal authority over
such activities on non-Indian owned lands."14 The Court said the Montana Rule
only applies to disputes arising on "lands no longer owned by the tribe."W
l s
The Supreme Court's decisions in subsequent cases emphasize that application of
the Montana Rule depends on whether the actions in dispute took place on Indian
land or on non-Indian land. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,"6 the state
claimed jurisdiction, pursuant to Montana, over the regulation of non-Indian hunting
and fishing on Indian land. The Court held that the Montana Rule does not
automatically allow state jurisdiction over non-Indian conduct on Indian land.
Montana stated that Indian tribes can prohibit hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on Indian land."7 The plurality opinion in Brendale went on to distinguish the
Iowa Mutual rule cases by stating that these cases "did not involve the regulation
of fee lands, as did Montana."
' 8
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly "emphasized that there is a
significant geographic component to tribal sovereignty.""' 9 Tribal jurisdiction over
conduct occurring on non-Indian owned lands places the tribe's regulatory authority
into issue. If the tribe's regulatory authority were at issue, Montana and Brendale
would be applicable. However, Strate involved tribal civil jurisdiction over the
conduct of non-Indians on Indian land.
The accident in Strate occurred on Highway 8, which entered the reservation
pursuant to right-of-way. The Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the easement to the
North Dakota Highway Department on May 8, 1970, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-
328. Highway 8 crosses 6.59 miles of land, which the federal government holds in
trust for the Tribe and tribal members. The highway ends on the shores of Lake
Sakakawea, a federal water resource project. Highway 8 does not cross any non-
Indian owned land within the reservation." It is not used as a major thoroughfare.
The Court held that the accident occurred on alienated non-Indian land. It
reasoned that the right-of-way was made pursuant to a grant from the United States
114. See id. at 557. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe,
and with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that
if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may condition their
entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. What remains is the question
of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land
owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.
Id.
115. See id. at 564.
116. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-331 (1983).
117. See id.; see also U.S. ex rel. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901, 906 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Strictly speaking, the Montana exceptions are relevant only after the court concludes that
there has been a general divestiture of tribal authority over non-Indians by alienation of the land.").
118. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 427
(1989).
119. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).
120. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3, Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in
1996 WL 739255, at *3.
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to North Dakota. The Three Affiliated Tribes only retained the right to construct
crossings of the right-of-way. The Tribes consented to and received payment for the
grant. The Court decided that the Tribes cannot assert jurisdiction over the right-of-
way as long as the state maintains it as part of North Dakota's highway.''
In reality, the Tribes merely gave the state a limited easement to pave and
maintain the highway, granting only those rights that Congress has specifically
provided." The grant did not divest the Tribes of their authority to regulate
tortious conduct o:n the road. Chapter 4-A of the Code of Laws of the Three
Affiliated Tribes provides for tribal regulation over traffic offenses on the
reservation.' " The easement does not provide for any grants of jurisdictional
authority to the stat., or federal government. The state merely acquired an easement,
which is a property right less than fee simple. The Tribes granted the easement
specifically for improving and maintaining Highway 8.
Congress and the Supreme Court have long distinguished between limited
easements over Indian lands and complete divestment of Indian land." The Tribe
never completely divested itself of the land underlying the easement, which the
federal government holds in trust. The Tribe retained ownership of the lands
underlying the easement. The grant did not alienate to non-Indians the title to the
land on which this case arose. Although th6 state maintains a highway over the land
pursuant to an easement, the land remains Indian trust land."z The land underlying
the easement is still "Indian land."'" Therefore, this case involves the Tribes' civil
adjudicatory authority.
Because the Tribes' civil adjudicatory authority is at issue, the precedent followed
should have been National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. These two cases directly
dealt with tribal adjudicatory authority over conduct on Indian land. In Williams v.
Lee, the Court established the clear rule that tribes retain civil adjudicatory authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on Indian land unless Congress has divested such
jurisdiction. The Court recognized that Congress has not generally granted civil
jurisdiction to the states over court cases involving non-Indians on Indian land."
Therefore, the Court held that inherent and exclusive jurisdiction lies in the tribal
121. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. CL 1404, 1413 (1992); see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328
(1994) (governing federal grants of right-of-way over Indian lands).
122. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251 (1992).
123. See Brief of Petitioners-at 22, Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1996
WL 656356, at *22.
124. See Buttz v. Northern Pae. R.R. Co., 119 U.S. 55 (1886).
125. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992) (holding that absent express congressional provision otherwise, tribe retains
beneficial title to land underlying railroad right-of-way).
126. See, e.g., Burl'ngton Northern, 924 F.2d at 902-04; Davis v. Director, North Dakota Dep't of
Transp., 467 N.W.2d 420, 422 (N.D. 1991) (explaining that within Indian reservations, state highways
are "Indian country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
127. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-222 (1959).
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courts." The decisions in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual have somewhat
limited this holding.
These cases, however, establish that Congress has not generally divested tribal
civil jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on Indian land. In National
Farmers, the Court stated that the "extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require
a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has
been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative
or judicial decisions.
However, the Court failed to make this "careful examination of tribal
sovereignty." Tribal sovereignty is of a unique and limited character. "It exists only
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. Yet until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.""'3 Therefore, a
fundamental principle of inherent tribal sovereignty is that it can only be limited
when it has been expressly or implicitly divested by Congress.'3 ' The Supreme
Court has held implicit divestment of tribal sovereignty exists only when tribal
actions are in direct conflict with the interests of the national government. These
conflicts exist when the tribes: (1) engage in foreign relations; (2) alienate Indian
land to non-Indians without federal consent; or (3) exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians."
Tribal adjudicatory authority over non-Indians for conduct on Indian lands is an
important part of tribal sovereignty. The Court in Iowa Mutual expressly noted that
civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in tribal courts, unless
Congress expressly limits it.' Because Indian tribes retain all of the inherent
attributes of sovereignty, congressional silence allows tribal sovereignty to remain
intact.'34
However, such deference is not without its problems. Courts are forced to decide
how exhaustion should continue without a tribal forum. This is known as the "no
forum problem."'35 Although a state court can rely on general subject matter
128. See id. at 223; see also, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)
(holding that jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on Indian land is exclusive with
the tribe when state's authority to regulate the hunting and fishing of non-Indians on Indian land is
challenged).
129. See National Farmers Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985).
130. Brief of Petitioners at 15, Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1996 WL
656356, at *15.
131. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,223 (1959) ("If this power is to be taken away from
them, it is for Congress to do it."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) ("[A] proper
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions
that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.").
132. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 699 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980)).
133. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
134. See Brief of Petitioners at 15, Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), available in 1996
WL 656356, at *15.
135. See Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
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jurisdiction over civil actions arising on Indian lands within its borders, federal
courts do not have such jurisdiction. Obviously, federal courts do not want to apply
the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine when the tribal courts do not provide a forum in
which to resolve the dispute. Therefore, the courts must determine whether the
absence of a tribal forum is sufficient to create federal jurisdiction. There is
preseritly a split on this very issue. Some courts have held that state or federal
courts automatically have jurisdiction when there is no tribal forum." Still other
have held that Williams has effectively precluded state jurisdiction, regardless of
whether there is a forum available in the tribal courts.
37
Although National Farmers succeeded in broadening tribal sovereignty, it failed
to address directly the "no forum problem." However, National Farmers noted that
the language of 2; U.S.C. § 1331 states that the federal district court "shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. It is well settled that this statutory grant of jurisdiction
will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a
statutory origin. "i"" The Court defined federal common law as "laws" under
section 1331.239
Therefore, invoking section 1331 federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts
is possible based on a common law jurisdictional dispute, without involving a
federal statute or Constitutional provision. It is only necessary to base the claim on
a dispute "arising under" federal law. Federal courts frequently decide issues
relating to an Indian tribe's powers to regulate the actions of non-Indians. They
have also decided the extent of the tribe's immunity from state action. Federal law
has consistently been the judicial basis for these decisions. Therefore, in the absence
Expanding Federal lurirdiction, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1130-31(1995) ("The [no-forum] problem exists,
for example, when a tribal ordinance fails to extend jurisdiction over the parties or over the cause of
action that has come to federal court for relief, or, in more extreme cases, when no tribal court system
exists.").
136. See id. at 1131 n.205; see also Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 634 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Alaska native village's
complaint seeking to evict nonmembers from its territory); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose,
893 F.2d 1074, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the federal court had jurisdiction over a suit brought
by an Indian tribe to enforce its ordinance against a non-Indian when the tribe has no tribal court);
Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction over the dispute because there are no tribal courts and the state courts lack jurisdiction).
137. See Reynolds, supra note 135, at 1131-32 n.206; see also Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P,2d
522, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App, 1977) (holding that the fact of whether or not a tribal court provides a forum
for the recovery for personal injuries has no significance in determining whether a state court has
jurisdiction); Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the federal and
state courts did not have jurisdiction in a matter where the plaintiff, a non-Indian, had no forum in which
to bring a valid lawsuit because of a tribal jurisdictional statute that required plaintiffs to be a "resident
or doing business on the. Reservation for at least one year prior to the institution of the proceeding" and
limiting the court's subject matter jurisdiction to suits in which the amount in controversy did not exceed
$300).
138. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 850.
139. See id
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of a tribal forum for the exhaustion of tribal remedies, the federal court may resolve
the underlying dispute through federal question jurisdiction.
However, tribal exhaustion does not limit subsequent federal court consideration
of jurisdictional questions. Although federal courts generally interpret National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual as creating an expansive view of tribal sovereignty, the
courts in essence create federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts over a
variety of disputes that were previously outside federal jurisdiction. A rule that
opens a decision from the tribe's highest judicial body to subsequent litigation in the
lower federal courts will ultimately diminish tribal sovereignty.
In addition, before the establishment of the exhaustion rule, federal courts refused
to hear cases involving contract disputes, lease disputes and personal injuries
occurring on Indian land. Under National Farmers' expansive definition of federal
question jurisdiction, these cases present issues that federal and state courts will
decide. Therefore, the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine would ultimately open the door
for federal courts to entertain jurisdiction over tribal disputes, ultimately resulting
in an even further limitation on tribal sovereignty, rather than allowing tribes to
manage their own affairs.
VI. Conclusion
The fundamental principle of inherent tribal sovereignty is that it remains intact
unless it has been divested by Congress. Indian tribes have been divested of some
aspects of tribal sovereignty by incorporating within the United States and accepting
its protection. These divestments include the rights to: (1) engage in foreign
relations; (2) alienate Indian land to non-Indians without federal consent; and (3)
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Still, congressional action has
divested other aspects of tribal sovereignty. The Supreme Court has even held that
any divestment of tribal authority over the tribe's own affairs requires an express
authorization by Congress.
However, some of the greatest divestments of tribal sovereignty have come from
the Supreme Court. In fact, Strate v. A-i Contractors, the Supreme Court's latest
decision involving tribal sovereignty, has divested Indian tribes of a basic element
of inherent sovereignty: a tribe's power to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction and
enforce its laws against all people within its borders. Strate's unanimous decision
established a hard rule that the Supreme Court will not tolerate an Indian tribe
exercising jurisdiction over a non-Indian for conduct within Indian lands.
By applying Montana to issues involving the assertion of tribal jurisdiction over
conduct arising on Indian lands, Strate has in essence destroyed any differences
between tribal adjudicatory authority and tribal regulatory authority. In doing so, it
has all but overruled Iowa Mutual's clear preference for tribal jurisdiction, which
has the effect of making the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine a mere procedural step
before removing a case from tribal courts and placing it in state or federal courts.
The only authority a tribal court retains is the right to explain its basis for asserting
or denying jurisdiction.
Therefore, Strate has established a new rule that a jurisdictional challenge in a
tribal court is sufficient to allow state and federal courts to review a tribal court's
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initial decision to assert jurisdiction. This new rule thus basically gives these courts
appellate review over the tribal courts. State and federal courts are no longer
required to wait for the tribal court's final disposition. In other words, state and
federal courts now have the power to preempt tribal courts and assert jurisdiction
over any case involving a non-Indian.
The Strate decision represents yet another bite the Supreme Court has taken out
of tribal sovereignty. In fact, Strafe cuts to the very core of tribal self-government
and self-determination. The Supreme Court has expressed such a limited view of
tribal sovereignty that congressional intervention is necessary. Congress should step
in and provide new legislation to further its policy of supporting tribal sovereignty.
This legislation may be the only savior for the tribal judicial system from consistent
attacks and limitations imposed by the United States Supreme Court.
Aaron S. Duck
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